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Abstract
It is argued that even those extant theories of similarity (e.g.
Tversky, 1977) that are sensitive to the fact that many similarity
statements are asymmetrical are unable to deal with a number of important
symmetry related issues. In particular, it is claimed that an entire class
of similarity statements remains largely unaccounted for. These statements
comprise nonliteral similarity statements such as similes. It is suggested
that what is needed is some way of relating similarity to nonliteralness, or
metaphoricity. A proposal for doing this based on a modification of
Tversky's contrast model, and on comparisons of the relative degree of
salience of attributes of the two terms that are shared or shareable is
offered. The ramifications of this proposal are reviewed and the central
issues that a marriage between a theory of similarity and of metaphoricity
ought to address are identified.
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Beyond Literal Similarity*
Most theoretical approaches to the problem of similarity have been
based on what Tversky (1977) calls "geometric models", namely models in
which the similarity between two objects is given in terms of their distance
in a multidimensional space. One of the most serious difficulties with such
approaches is that they fail to account for the lack of symmetry that is
often found in similarity statements, since geometric models are constrained
by the fact that the distance between two points in a Euclidean space is the
same regardless of the direction in which it is measured. Partly in
response to this problem, Tversky offers a contrast model based on feature
matching which seems better able to deal with the asymmetry problem. But
neither Tversky's model as it stands, nor those that he criticizes, are able
to deal well with a variety of symmetry related issues. In particular, they
do not deal well with what might be called "nonliteral similarity
statements", one of whose most prominent characteristics is that they are
radically asymmetrical. The most obvious examples of such statements are
similes, but nonliteral similarity statements seem to be the basis of many
kinds of figurative uses of language, and in particular, they seem to
constitute the basis of metaphors. Since so many theories suppose that
metaphors and related tropes are really statements of similarity (see
Ortony, Reynolds, and Arter, 1978, for a review), they appear to presuppose
an account of similarity that is sufficiently powerful to deal with
nonliteral similarity statements too, even though no such theory exists.
The main purpose of this paper is to offer some proposals that might lead to
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a comprehensive theory of similarity--a theory that goes beyond literal
similarity, to nonliteral similarity. What is presented does not itself
constitute such a theory, although some of the proposals might feature as
elements of one. Rather, what is presented is a number of questions and in
some cases, hypothesized solutions. While several investigators are
currently engaged in research which promises to provide data pertinent to
some of the issues raised here, it may take many years for us to accumulate
sufficient data to resolve the complex theoretical issues involved.
Therefore, it seems appropriate to attempt to identify the issues and to
propose possible solutions to them now in the spirit of the hypothetico-
deductive method.
In a recent paper, Verbrugge and McCarrell (1977) identified three
puzzles that a theory of the comprehension of metaphors ought to solve. The
first of these concerns the relationship between the terms in a metaphor,
particularly that between the topic, and the metaphorical vehicle.
(Traditionally the topic of a metaphor is what the metaphor is about, the
vehicle is the term or expression being used metaphorically--often the
predicate, and the ground of the metaphor is what the topic and the vehicle
share by virtue of which the metaphor can be interpreted as being meaningful
rather than anomalous.) It is not sufficient, Verbrugge and McCarrell
argued, to assume that "the topic is passively schematized by salient
properties of a vehicle domain: The topic and vehicle terms interact in
specifying the ground. (p.529)" The question is, "How?". The second puzzle
is that of identifying "the compatibility constraints operating between the
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topic and the vehicle that govern what relations from the vehicle domain can
be extended successfully or easily." In other words, what is it that
controls the goodness of a metaphor, making some juxtapositions of terms
discernible as metaphors, and others not. The third puzzle concerns how to
characterize the topic domain so that it has sufficient flexibility for
"novel conceptualization", while permitting differing degrees of
compatibility of vehicle domains.
Apart from these three, there are other, equally important, questions
that one might want to answer. First there is the question of symmetry. Why
are some similarity statements less symmetrical than others, and
particularly, why do similes tend to be much less symmetrical than literal
comparisons? For example, the simile, Mountain roads are like snakes
becomes quite bizarre when reversed to give Snakes are like mountain roads,
whereas the literal comparison, Snakes are like eels gives Eels are like
snakes when reversed, which makes perfectly good, and somewhat comparable,
sense. The point does not concern the degree of similarity, but the meaning
of the statements. The claim that similes are asymmetrical is a claim about
the effects of reversals on the meaning of the original statement. It either
becomes meaningless, or it changes radically. In literal comparisons, the
meaning change tends to be much less noticeable, even if the perceived
similarity is low. Thus, if Butchers are like bakers (a low similarity
literal comparison) is reversed, the result seems to be comparable, both
with respect to the degree of similarity and the meaning. But if the
nonliteral similarity statement Butchers are like surqeons is reversed, the
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meaning is entirely different and the perceived similarity is not
necessarily related.
Second, why do certain kinds of modifications to similarity statements,
such as specifying a dimension along which the two terms are similar, serve
to increase the perceived similarity between the two terms while appearing
to reduce the metaphoricity? Thus, the statement John is like an ox seems
to be less literal than the modified form, John is strong like an ox, even
though the inference that John is like a ox with respect to his strength is
easy to make. The effect of specifying a dimension of comparability in an
otherwise nonliteral similarity statement is much more obvious if that
dimension is stated as being the dimension very explicitly. For example, the
statement This bread is like concrete, seems to most people to be much less
literal than With respect to its hardness, this bread is like concrete.
Third, why are some statements of similarity uninterpretable (as either
literal similarity statements, or as similes)? The statement Machinists are
like ferns seems to resist interpretation even metaphorically. This
question is closely related to Verbrugge and McCarrell's (second) puzzle
about compatibility constraints. Finally, related to all the others, and of
central concern in the present article, what is metaphoricity, and how does
it relate to similarity?
In order to address questions such as these, a number of theoretical
constructs have to be used. Most of them are quite familiar, but it is
important to lay them out so that their interpretation in the current
context is clear and unambiguous. The first requirement is that there be a
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useable notion of a knowledge representation. A knowledge representation is
a structured representation of the knowledge associated with some particular
entity, be it a person, place, thing, event, experience, or whatever. The
representations that will be presupposed here have been variously called
frames (e.g. Minsky, 1975), scripts (e.g. Schank & Abelson,1977), and
schemata (e.g. Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). Henceforth, the term schema will
be employed. A crucial characteristic of schemata, for current purposes, is
that they embed, so that a schema may contain tokens of, and tokens of it
may be contained by, other schemata. Such subschemata can be viewed as
representing predicates or attributes of the schemata that they dominate, or
by which they are dominated. It is necessary that in any model dealing with
the utilization of schemata in comprehension, the availability of schemata
and of subschemata should be sensitive to context, as will become apparent
in discussing the second important concept, salience.
There are several studies (e.g. Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrell &
Nitsch, 1974; Anderson and Ortony, 1975) that have supported the claim that
context influences and determines the particular aspects of word meanings
that are salient on any particular occasion. Put in terms of schema theory,
this partly reduces to the claim that in any particular context some
subschemata may be irrelevant, or inappropriate, and consequently will not
be involved in the comprehension process. This, in turn, can be expressed by
saying that the salience of constituent structures in a knowledge
representation can change as a function of context. In this paper it will
be assumed that salience can be operationally defined in terms of subjects'
Beyond Literal Similarity
7
estimates of the prominence of a particular attribute with respect to a
concept to which it does or could apply.
In what follows, a basic, idealized account of subjective similarity
will be sketched, the primary purpose of which will be to characterize the
difference between literal and nonliteral similarity statements. Then, the
remainder of the paper will be devoted to examining some of the puzzles
raised above, as well as to a number of related issues.
The Basic Proposal
We are now in a position to address the question of similarity, having
laid out explanations of the concepts to be used. To recapitulate, these are
the notion of a schema (or a concept), the notion of an attribute (a
subschema), the notion of attribute salience (or importance), and,
implicitly, the notion of application (of an attribute to a concept). For
the purposes of the discussion, it will sometimes be convenient to ignore
the structural aspects of schemata and to concentrate on the salience of the
subschemata. Some of the explanations that will be offered will be offered
in terms of the relative position of attributes in the set of attributes
ordered by salience, with the most salient attributes being thought of as at
the top of the list, and the least salient attributes at the bottom. This is
only a convenience and it has no implications for the nature of schematic
structures in general.
The obvious place to start is with the theory that Tversky (1977)
proposed, a theory designed to account for the degree of perceived
similarity between two objects represented by, say, the terms a and b. The
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theory, which is well supported by the data, is that the perceived
similarity, s(a,b), is a weighted function of the intersection of attributes
of a and b, less the sum of a weighted function of the attributes
distinctive to one and a weighted function of the attributes distinctive to
the other, giving:
(1) s(a,b) = 6f(A n B) - af(A - B) - 1f(B - A)
Here, the function "f" is a measure of the salience of features or sets of
features, while 8, a and 13 are parameters, which, as their values change,
give rise to different similarity scales. A and B represent the sets of
features of a and b respectively. It is assumed that the salience of a set
of attributes is given by the sum of the salience of each member of the set
(p.332). Tversky argued that there are two principle factors that determine
the salience of an attribute. The first is intensity, which is independent
of the object, and the second is diagnosticity, which is not. Diagnosticity
is concerned with the discriminability of an object from other objects with
which it is implicitly or explicitly classified. It therefore presupposes a
context of alternatives for the object. In the absence of such a context,
or in a context where the contrast set can only be considered to be the
universe of objects in general, diagnosticity plays no role. Unfortunately,
Tversky does not explain how intensity and diagnosticity interact, but for
present purposes the important point is that where diagnosticity can play no
role the salience of an attribute is independent of the object(s) of which
it is an attribute. This means that the measure of an attribute's salience
would be a constant and that it would contribute a constant amount to the
Beyond Literal Similarity
9
overall salience of the stimulus, f(A). Mathematically this is very
convenient since it means that the computation of the salience of the set of
intersecting attributes in (1) raises no serious problem: f(A ) (the measure
of attribute n in A), and f(B ) (the measure of that same attribute in B)
will be the same.
In order to proceed with our account, it will be necessary to start
with an idealized statement and then to relax some of the constraints so as
to account for some of the real divergences from the ideal model. The chief
difference between the model about to be described and Tversky's model is
that here it will be supposed that the salience of an attribute generally
depends on the object of which it is an attribute, as well as on other,
contextual, factors. In the present model the perceived similarity between
two objects depends, in part, on the relative level of salience of matching
attributes, thus, in the general case, it is not assumed that f(A ) = f(B ).n n
Two reasons underlie the rejection of this assumption. First is the desire
to save the axiom of minimality, an axiom that Tversky suggested is false
(p. 328). Second is the belief that attributes cannot be accorded the same
salience to different objects in a psychologically meaningful way.
In the context of similarity and dissimilarity judgements, the axiom of
minimality asserts that the difference between two objects is never less
than the difference between one of those objects and itself. From this it
follows that everything is equally similar to itself, whereas Tversky's
model entails that objects with many attributes are more similar to
themselves than objects with fewer attributes (e.g. televisions are more
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like televisions than are cathode ray tubes like cathode ray tubes.)
Tversky's rejection of minimality is not very compelling. For example, he
noted that in recognition experiments false alarm rates can exceed hit
rates, but this need show little more than that the stimuli and the non-
veridical memorial representations of them are not identical. The reason for
wanting to maintain the axiom of minimality is more complicated and will be
discussed more fully in the section on attribute substitution and domain
incongruence. The basic idea, however, is that sometimes an attribute is
more important with respect to one object than it is with respect to
another, independent of diagnosticity. This appears to be an empirical
issue, yet to be settled, but it is one of the motivating factors behind the
present rejection of Tversky's equality of salience of attributes
assumption.
Once this assumption is rejected, a rule for determining the salience
of the intersection of A and B in (1) is needed. It is this rule that
constitutes the most important difference between Tversky's model and the
present one. A central claim of the present proposal is that the salience of
the intersection of A and B is dependent on the salience values of matching
elements in B rather than in A, or rather than some function of the values
in both. Thus, attributes that are of low salience in B make little
contribution to any of the terms in (1). The measure of similarity, as
given by (1), remains essentially the same as Tversky's in cases where the
matching attributes are of high salience in both A and B. Under these
conditions we will say that the two terms are perceived as being literally
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similar. Such a notion seems to accord with common sense. It could be taken
as axiomatic that if two things share some characteristics that are
important to both then those things will be perceived as being literally
simi lar.
However, it is now possible to go further than the mere
characterization of literal similarity. Both nonliteral similarity and
anomalies can be characterized. To the extent that matching attributes are
of less high salience in A than they are in B, comparisons between the the
corresponding terms will be nonliteral. And, to the extent that similarity
statements are neither literal nor nonliteral in the sense just explained,
they will be anomalous. Thus, literal and nonliteral similarity statements
do not form mutually exclusive classes of statements. Nor, for that matter,
do anomalous and meaningful ones. It is preferable to think in terms of
three dimensions of similarity statements, the literal, the metaphorical,
and the anomalous. Sometimes one or two of these components contribute
virtually nothing to the perceived similarity (e.g. the anomalous component
contributes nothing if a statement is perceived as being a literal
similarity statement). A more detailed account of the relationship between
the three components is offered in the section on processing.
What is being claimed is that the degree of metaphoricity of a
similarity statement can be characterized, to a first approximation, by
considering the difference in salience between the matching attributes for a
and for b, together with the (independent) degree of salience in each.
Literal similarity statements normally have a low degree of metaphoricity,
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and nonliteral similarity statements normally have a high degree of
metaphoricity. The fact that the degree of metaphoricity is related to the
perceived similarity, is captured by having the measure of metaphoricity
included as part of the measure of similarity. The locus of metaphoricity
lies in the matching attributes. What distinguishes the literal, from the
metaphorical, from the nonsensical, is the relative salience of the matching
attributes in the schemata underlying the terms in the similarity statement.
According to this view, literal similarity statements are likely to be
perceived as being more similar because the set of intersecting attributes
is likely to be larger than it is for nonliteral similarity statements.
Nonliteral similarity statements are likely to be perceived as being more
similar than anomalous ones because in the case of the latter the elements
in the set of intersecting attributes (if there are any) will have low
salience levels. Later it will transpire that other factors play a role in
determining not only the relative degree of metaphoricity, but also the
aptness of the comparison.
The present proposal, then, not only distinguishes literal from
metaphorical similarity statements by incorporating a measure of
metaphoricity into the measure of similarity, but it also characterizes two
sources of anomaly in putative similarity statements. Anomalous similarity
statements are those that neither satisfy the conditions for being literally
similar, nor those for being metaphorically similar. They include cases
where either low salient attributes of the b term are comparably low salient
attributes of the a term, but where there are no overlapping high salient
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attributes, or cases where the only matches are of high salient attributes
of the a term with low salient attributes of the b term.
The view outlined above has many ramifications. It also requires many
caveats and modifications if it is to be taken from its present, idealized,
state to a realistic model. Before discussing some of these ramifications
and modifications it may be helpful to see the simplified, skeletal form of
it as it applies to some examples. Consider the following similarity
statements:
(2) Billboards are like placards
(3) Billboards are like warts
(4) Billboards are like spoons
(5) Lawn mowers are like lectures
(6) Sleeping pills are like lectures
According to the present proposal, (2) is a literal comparison since
billboards and placards share a number of high salient attributes. By
contrast, (3) is a nonliteral comparison because, although no salient
attributes are shared, there are some high salient attributes of warts that
are less high salient attributes of billboards (e.g. they are ugly). Thus,
(3) is a metaphorical similarity statement, that is, a simile. The remaining
cases are anomalous. In (4) the only attributes common to both terms are
trivial, low salient, attributes, such as being a thing or physical object,
and thus (4) is uninterpretable. Billboards and spoons are just not
perceived as being similar. In it too the two terms seem not even to share
low salient attributes and consequently (5) is also anomalous. Finally, in
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(6), the only match seems to be of a high salient attribute of the a term,
"are soporific", and a low salient attribute of the b term. It is true, as
with most well-formed sentences in a language, that an interpretation could
be forced. That is, it would be possible to construct a context in which
similarity statements like (4), (5), or (6) could be interpreted. More will
be said of this later. For the moment, it is sufficient to observe that
without conjuring up a context which would serve to change the relative
degrees of salience of the attributes of the terms, such similarity
statements cannot be given meaningful interpretations. This point does not
depend on its being impossible to conjure up a suitable context--it almost
never is impossible. It depends merely on the fact that it is much more
difficult to produce such a context for anomalous cases than it is for
meaningful ones.
The chief modifications that will be needed to make these claims
plausible for modeling the way in which people make and understand
similarity statements pertain to attribute substitution and domain
incongruence on the one hand, and to what might be called
a13-reduction on the other. The first of these areas relates to the fact that
our linguistic labels for attributes may not always refer to the same
attribute. For example, "is a source of wealth" can be applied to both
goldmines and to encyclopedias, but it is not clear that the one attribute
can be directly substituted for the other. The sense seems to change
depending on the domain of the objects. Domain incongruence turns out to be
an important constraint on attribute substitution, but it is also an
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important source of metaphoricity that needs to be dealt with. The second
modification is related to certain processing mechanisms that need to be
posited in order to account for the kinds of judgements people make. If two
objects seem not to share important characteristics they may still be
perceived as being metaphorically similar. It seems useful to suppose that
when people cannot find important shared attributes they may reduce the
weights normally assigned to the distinctive attributes, that is, they may
reduce the values of a and a in (1). These issues will be discussed in some
of the sections that follow, but first it will be helpful to return to the
problem of symmetry.
The Symmetry Problem
Any theory of similarity must be able to specify the variables that
influence differences between similarity statements, or classes of them,
with respect to the degree of symmetry of the similarity relation.
According to Tversky, the main variable is the task, in particular, whether
the judgement is formulated in a directional or non-directional manner. This
has the effect of changing the values of a and 1 relative to one another. If
the task is formulated in a directional manner then a and 1 are likely to
differ, if not they are likely to be equal.
In considering the question of symmetry it is important not to overlook
the fact that the sentence topic itself imposes constraints, so that in the
general case a difference between "a is like b" and "b is like a" will
always remain because in the first case the sentence topic is "a" and in the
second it is "b", that is, there are constraints resulting from such things
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as the given/new relationship, and the subject/predicate relationship.
Tversky refers to this as the focusing effect, noting that normally greater
weight is assigned to the attributes of the subject term than to those of
the second term (i.e. a > 3). In the section on processing this issue will
be raised again, but in the meantime the difference can be ignored by
thinking in terms of what constitutes the basis of the comparison. Viewed
in this way, the question of symmetry seems to reduce to the fact that a
similarity relation will be symmetrical if the basis for the comparison is
the same regardless of the order of mention of the terms in it. Thus, if a
is like b in exactly the same respects in which b is like a, then the
relation will be symmetrical. It should by now be clear that this condition
can only hold for literal similarity statements, and even then, only for
some. In the ideal case, literal comparisons share attributes that are at
the same relatively high level of salience, whereas similes share high
salient B and low salient A attributes. If all the shared attributes in a
simile have this high-B/low-A relation, then the simile, if reversed, will
result in an anomalous comparison. Furthermore it follows that with certain
kinds of anomalous cases (low-B/high-A), the reversal will result in an
interpretable simile, as is the case, for example, with (6). Anomalous cases
of low-B and low-A, are also reversible in the trivial sense that they are
uninterpretable in both directions, and for the same reasons.
This account seems to handle the radical difference in symmetry between
literal comparisons and similes (i.e. between literal and nonliteral
similarity statements), but it does not yet explain why there should be
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variations within these two classes. To get at these internal variations it
is necessary to relax the constraints imposed by the ideal theoretical
notion, towards something that better approximates psychological reality.
In order to do this, it has to be recognized that as a matter of fact there
are probably very few cases in which the match of attributes is of high to
high all at the same relative levels of salience. This being the case, it
follows that in most similarity statements there is likely to be some non-
zero degree of metaphoricity. Thus, in literal comparisons, symmetry will
be maintained just to the extent that the relative salience levels of shared
attributes are the same.
The fact that, in general, pairs of terms in a comparison are not
likely to have matching attributes only at the same level of salience has
other implications for symmetry. Consider, again, (3). The basis of the
comparison lies in high salient attributes of warts such as being
protrusions and being ugly. However, when reversed to give,
(7) Warts are like billboards
other attributes seem to take over. Now, the notions of prominence and
obviousness seem to be more central. Thus the meaning of (3) is different
from that of (7). In literal comparisons, where the basis of comparison is
more likely to remain the same regardless of the order of the two terms, the
difference in meaning between the two orders is generally much less
dramatic, although residual matches of high to low may still have an effect.
This almost certainly relates to Tversky's interesting observation that "the
variant is more similar to the prototype than the prototype is to the
variant (p.5333)", as evidenced by comparing (8) with its reversal.
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(8) North Korea is similar to Red China.
In cases where the literal similarity is very high, that is in cases where
most of matches are at similar levels of salience, the maintenance of
symmetry is very obvious, as in (9) and (10).
(9) Redcurrants are like blackcurrants
(10) Blackcurrants are like redcurrants
The general conclusion, then, is that the degree of symmetry is
inversely related to the degree of metaphoricity, so that the more
metaphorical the comparison, the less symmetrical it is likely to be.
Notwithstanding this, it remains true that some other factors also cause
asymmetry. In particular, there may be subtle meaning changes resulting from
high-B/low-A matches becoming low-B/high-A matches and vice versa. These
need not necessarily result in a change in actual judged similarity, since
they could cancel one another out. Second, the kind of variables mentioned
earlier, but ignored in our discussion--the subject/predicate relation, the
given/new relation, relative amounts of knowledge associated with the terms,
and the typicality of the terms--these variables will almost always have a
residual effect, an effect that can to a large extent be handled by
accepting Tversky's account wherein, usually, a > 3.
Diagnosticity and Metaphoricity
An important component of Tversky's (1977) theory is the diagnosticity
principle. The diagnosticity principle is basically concerned with the fact
that context can influence the salience of attributes. Indeed, the
influence of context may even extend to introducing an attribute that
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otherwise would be trivial. Tversky's example is that the attribute "real"
has no diagnostic value in the context of actual animals, that is, it would
be of very low salience. Yet in the context of animals that included
imaginary and mythical beasts it might become very important. The
diagnosticity principle is indispensable to an understanding of why it is
that specifying, or even merely suggesting a dimension of similarity in what
would otherwise be a simile, reduces the level of perceived metaphoricity.
To see how this works, compare (11) and (12):
(11) John's face was I ike a beet
(12) John's face was red like a beet
In (12) John's face is compared to a beet with respect to redness. The
effect of specifying the dimension is to identify the most diagnostic
attribute(s). Accordingly, all other attributes of both John's face and of
beets have less impact on the perceived similarity between the two. Another
way of putting this is to say that the salience of the color attributes is
increased above the salience of all the other attributes so that they no
longer play a significant role. The result is a match of high salient to
high salient attributes which is the characteristic of a literal comparison.
However, even with respect to an individual attribute such as color or size,
the match may not be perfect; John's face was perhaps not literally the
color of a beet. This suggests that fine tuning is required, that the
attribute of color itself has attributes which may be more or less well
matched (intensity, hue, and saturation, for example). Consequently, even
when an attribute of comparison has been foregrounded in this way, the
Beyond Literal Similarity
20
similarity of two objects with respect to that attribute can vary. This
variation, however, is now with respect to literal similarity, rather than
metaphorical similarity.
There remains, however, an interesting vestige of metaphoricity. Even
though the replacement in (12) of a high-B/low-A salience match by a high-B/
high-A match as a result of the explicit mention of a shared attribute has
been proposed as an explanation of the elimination of any perceived
metaphoricity, it is by no means clear that (12) is completely free of a
metaphorical element. Certainly there remain strong constraints on the
natural order of terms in it, and concomitantly, (12) is asymmetrical.
Perhaps one reason for this is that whereas the attribute is matched
qualitatively, it is not matched quantitatively. Statements like (12)
depend for their effectiveness on the intensity of the matching attribute
being higher in B than in A. This may relate to Tversky's observation that
we normally find the more natural order of terms in a similarity statement
to be the one in which a deviant object is referred to in subject position,
and the more prototypical one in the object position, as in (8). In the
case of (12), then, something is needed for the b term that is more
prototypically red--it would be unnatural to compare the redness of John's
face to something that was typically less red (e.g. a can of paint). This
point becomes more obvious with attributes like cold, where the perception
and measurement of intensity is more commonplace (see, for example, the
discussion of (17) below). If this is right, then another source of
asymmetry in literal comparisons has been identified, namely differences in
Beyond Literal Similarity
21
intensity of (aspects of) shared attributes. There appears to be an
interesting analogue between differences in intensity in literal comparisons
and differences in salience in nonliteral ones.
The proposal, then, is that finding a nominal match, even if it is a
high/high one, does not guarantee symmetry not only because of the
possibility that a > 1, but also because a matching attribute may vary with
respect to some of its own attributes. Thus, even though John is strong like
an ox isolates strength as the matching attribute, it is presumably the case
that while both may be very strong, John is less strong than the typical ox.
In general, the determination of such within-attribute similarity calls for
the same kind of operations as are required for normal similarity
judgements, consequently, in the general case the process of similarity
perception may have to be viewed as being a recursive one. So long as
attributes are considered as subschemata, the idea of attributes themselves
having attributes seems to be perfectly acceptable, for it is part of the
theory of the representation of knowledge that the current account of
similarity presupposes. However, it should be noted that there does seem to
be a price to be paid for gaining the flexibility that the embedding
characteristic of schemata endows on attributes. It appears to be
increasingly difficult to pin down the notion of an attribute. In
particular, the question arises as to how one could anchor the notion of an
attribute, especially that of "same attribute" for the purposes of empirical
investigations. This issue will be raised again in the next section, but it
may be worth noting now that, probably, there is no way to insure that two
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putatively matched attributes are the same attribute, except in a few
limiting cases where two things are, so to speak, tarred with the same
brush. The problem, in other words, is not a problem specific to the
current proposals, but a quite general problem in psychology. Even in
domains of inquiry where investigators have been at pains to employ the
notion of "features" unambiguously (e.g. concept learning, typicality
research) by using artificial stimuli, the problem persists. Suppose, for
example, that one is using schematic faces in some experimental task. Figure
1(a) is considered to be the prototype, or an instance of the to-be-learned
Insert Figure 1 about here
concept, or whatever. The pair of diagonal lines in Figure 1(a) are assumed
to be eye brows. But now one has to distinguish between the feature itself
(two angular lines, separated by such and such a distance, at such and such
an orientation and of such and such a length etc.) and the interpretation of
the feature, eye brows. Are those two lines the same feature in figure 1(b)
where they are interpreted as a moustache, and in figure 1(c) where they are
interpreted as the neck? Then, again, are they the same if one changes some
aspect, such as the separation? There really is no objective answer to such
questions. Usually the answer given is that the pair of diagonal lines in
1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) are different features, but that answer is stipulated.
It is an assumption, not an established fact. One may, therefore, have to
accept the conclusion that the notion of an attribute or a feature is and
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always has been difficult to pin down, and, for laboratory purposes, some
kind of pragmatic, operational account, may be the best that one can hope
for. Notice, also that the "feature" in question itself has embedded
features. It is composed of two lines, each of which has a length, and an
angular orientation. In other words, even the relatively simple attributes
used in artificial stimuli can have the characteristics that are claimed to
apply to attributes in the present proposals.
Attribute Substitution and Domain Incongruence
The examples of similes discussed so far have been conveniently
amenable to the approach to similarity and metaphoricity being advocated.
Not all cases, however, lend themselves to such a straightforward account.
In this section the proposals made so far will be discussed in the light of
some apparently more recalcitrant examples. Consider the following
similarity statements:
(13) Blood vessels are like aqueducts
(14) Encyclopedias are like goldmines.
To argue that (13) hinges on the fact that both blood vessels and aqueducts
are channels for carrying liquids, or that (14) works because encyclopedias,
like goldmines, are valuable and involve digging, would be a misleading
oversimplification. The proposals made so far seem not to apply very well to
these examples.
The first question to arise concerns the level of abstraction at which
attribute matches can be found. It is true that aqueducts are channels for
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carrying liquids, but it is not very convincing to argue that the predicate
is a channel for carrying liquids is represented as an important part of a
person's knowledge about aqueducts. It seems more natural to suppose that
what is represented directly in the schema for an aqueduct is that it is a
channel for carrying water. The predicate about liquids is the result of an
inference from the one about water. If generalized, this argument can lead
to the conclusion that blood vessels and aqueducts do not share any high
salient attributes (therefore they are apparently not literally similar),
but nor are any high salient attributes of aqueducts low salient attributes
of blood vessels, which, it was claimed earlier, is the hallmark of
metaphorical similarity statements. The conclusion, therefore, appears to be
that (13) is neither a literal similarity statement nor a metaphorical one,
so, it must be anomalous. The problem is that this conclusion is plainly
wrong. The solution to this problem seems to lie in a recursive application
of the process. Even if it is not the case that the two terms share salient
attributes, it is the case that they possess attributes that themselves do
share important attributes. If this line is adopted, it becomes necessary
to argue that a second source of metaphoricity is the existence of such
second order high salient matches as well as, or instead of high-B/low-A
salient matches.
Suppose, for a moment, that instead of conceiving of attributes as
simple predicates, we concentrate on the schematic structure of the terms,
that is, we also take into account the relationships between the attributes,
not just the attributes themselves. For aqueduct it might be supposed that
the schema is something like the following:
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(15) AQUEDUCT SCHEMA -- isa (x, AQUEDUCT).
Al: isa (x, channel).
A2: flows-through (water, x)
A3: purpose-of (Al, A2).
etc.
This can be compared with (16) which is the structure that might be used to
represent (some of) a person's knowledge about blood vessels.
(16) BLOOD-VESSEL SCHEMA -- isa (x, BLOOD-VESSEL).
Al: isa (x, channel).
A2: flows-through (blood, x)
A3: purpose-of (Al, A2).
A4: isa (artery, x).
etc.
Now, if Al, A2, and A3 are viewed as attributes, then it is no longer true
that aqueducts and blood vessels share no attributes. It can now be claimed
that both share the attribute Al. Furthermore, although the variables in A2
differ (water in the one case, and blood in the other) the structure of A2
is the same in each case. This, of course, relates to the proposal that the
process can be applied recursively to give a second order match of, for
example, flows-through (liquid, x). But, even more important is the fact
that A3 is shared, because A3 can be considered to be a kind of "meta-
attribute" which incorporates information about interattribute relations,
i.e. it incorporates information about the structure of the schemata
themselves. This is one of the reasons why it is necessary to utilize an
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approach to knowledge representations that incorporates structure, an
approach that is richer than a mere listing of simple attributes. It appears
to be the only way to capture the fact that many statements of similarity
depend on there being some structural isomorphism between the knowledge
associated with the two concepts, rather than merely a match of simple
attributes. These observations indicate how sensitive attribute matching is
to the way in which attributes are represented, how they relate, and what
they are, and they may well help to establish the superiority of one kind of
representational approach over another. But, they do not yet say anything
about the degree of metaphoricity. The answer to this question, however, can
now remain essentially the same as it was before, namely that it depends on
the relative salience of the matching attributes within each schema. Here,
one can expect considerable individual differences. Some people will judge
(13) to be more metaphorical than others. This is partly because it appears
that a direct match can be found on Al. In addition, a second order match
can be found on A2 which would give rise to an element of metaphoricity, and
which would again come into play in finding a match on A3.
Clearly, (15) and (16) represent what is probably only a small part of
what people know about aqueducts and blood vessels, and certainly it is not
realistic to speculate about the relative salience levels of the attributes
for these particular examples. It is realistic, however, to raise certain
questions about the quality of the matches where there are matches.
Consider first the match on Al. There are many different kinds of channels,
some man-made, and varying greatly in size and material of construction, and
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some natural, also varying in similar respects. It is certainly the case
that a blood vessel is a very different kind of channel from an aqueduct.
But, if this is the case, on what basis can it be claimed that they share
the same attribute? In other words, is the supposition that being a channel
is the same attribute in the two cases correct, or is it merely a case of
being misled by polysemy? This is the "attribute substitution" problem. One
might be able to approximate to what people actually do by supposing that
two attributes count as the same either provided that one cannot
discriminate between them, or, provided that those two attributes are more
like one another than either one of them is like some third attribute. The
first of these criteria is probably too strict, the second presupposes a
theory of similarity, which is precisely the problem that gives rise to it
in the first place. Again one seems to be pushed in the direction of a
theory that needs to be applied, if not recursively, at least iteratively.
The fact that attributes often seem to refer to different kinds of
entities in different contexts has to be addressed in any theory that bases
similarity judgements on matching, since it is possible to argue that
perfect attribute matching may be little more than a theoretical
abstraction. It certainly does seem to constitute a challenge to Tversky's
rather strong assumption that the salience of an attribute is independent of
the object of which it is an attribute, since such a claim clearly makes
very little sense if the attributes that are allegedly shared are not really
the same attributes at all.
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The second, related problem, points to much the same dilemma, perhaps
even more dramatically. It can be illustrated by considering (14), where
subjects in a feature elicitation task typically list "being valuable" as a
high salient attribute of both encyclopedias and goldmines. Again, one is
inclined to say that the sense of the attribute is different in the two
cases. Among the senses of "being valuable" is a sense pertaining to
financial, or pecuniary, domains, and one pertaining to intellectual or
mental domains (c.f. Schank and Abelson's, 1977 distinction between PTRANS
and MTRANS). It is this lack of domain congruence that appears to give rise
to the problem of attribute substitution. Again, it seems that the only
reasonable solution to this problem is to suppose that a second order
similarity exists between the attributes in each of the two domains. In some
cases, this similarity may itself seem to be a metaphorical similarity, as
when subjects report that both encyclopedias and goldmines "involve
digging". If this is so, then it becomes even more important to employ a
general theory of similarity that encompasses nonliteral similarities.
Domain incongruence is presumably a question of degree. It can be
operationalized in fairly traditional terms, such as semantic distance. This
would involve determining the number of links required to connect two
concepts in a set inclusion hierarchy (see, for example, Collins and
Quillian, 1969). In schema theoretic terms such an approach would amount to
determining the number of levels of embedding required to reach a token of
the same schema within an embedded or embedding schema. Any such measure,
however, would have to be based on psychologically meaningful categories and
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attributes (as distinct from merely taxonomically possible ones.) This
constraint reintroduces the problem with which the present section started,
namely, the one discussed in connection with the relationship between
channels for carrying water, channels for carrying blood, and channels for
carrying liquids.
Now, even though incongruent domains do not guarantee metaphoricity,
they often are responsible for it. Consider, again, (4). Suppose that it is
accepted that billboards are in the domain of advertisements, while spoons
are in the domain of utensils. How can the assignment of a high degree of
metaphoricity to (4) on the basis of domain incongruence be blocked? And,
by contrast, if blood vessels are perceived as being quite similar to
aqueducts, why are not penguins perceived as being quite similar to wolves
in view of the fact that both are animals? One possible answer is that it
has something to do with the level of specificity of the categories to which
the things being compared are typically thought to belong. Although this
proposal is very tentative, suppose it were assumed that the determination
of some reasonably specific shared domain were a precondition for a sensible
similarity statement, i.e. that the existence of such a domain was a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for two things to be perceived as
being even potentially similar. Then, the perception of similarity and
metaphoricity would occur only after the satisfaction of this precondition.
One way to interpret the notion of a "reasonably specific shared domain"
would be in terms of basic level categories (e.g. Rosch, Mervis, Grey,
Johnson & Boyes-Brian, 1976). A level of specificity at or below the basic
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level would count as being "reasonably specific" whereas a level of
specificity more abstract than the basic level would not.
The consequences of this kind of assumption vis a vis the examples can
now be considered. The domains of advertisements and utensils do not come
together in any conceivable taxanomic structure in a category at or below
the specificity of a basic level category. So, (4) fails to satisfy the
precondition for a sensible similarity statement. By contrast, it has been
supposed that blood vessels and aqueducts come together in a domain of
channels or conduits, which does satisfy the precondition. Penguins and
wolves, while being relatively close semantically, only meet in the animal
category, which is at a level of specificity more abstract than the basic
level, consequently the precondition is again not satisfied. It need not
necessarily be possible to find a natural category, sometimes a
psychologically plausible category has to be "constructed". This, for
example, is probably the case for (14) where a lexical description might be
"place where things are stored", or "place where things can be found", or
"source of utility".
If some solution along these lines is adopted, there remains the
difficult question of how it can be integrated into the account of
similarity being proposed, particularly, how it can be related to the claims
being made about metaphoricity and relative salience levels. For the
moment, it will be assumed that this integration can be brought about by
finding suitable weights for the intersection term based on measures of
semantic remoteness and specificity.
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Domain Incongruence and the Role of Similarity
in Dual Function Terms
Domain incongruence and the problem of attribute substitution turn out
to be of fundamental importance in lexical semantics in general and in the
analysis of dual function terms in particular. Consider the following
example, (17), discussed at length by Searle (in press):
(17) Sally is (like) a block of ice
One aspect of (17) that is rather important, and sometimes overlooked, is
that it is ambiguous. If is used in the context of Sally coming in from an
extremely cold environment, it will have a much lower degree of perceived
metaphoricity than if it is used in the context of a disillusioned would-be
lover explaining Sally's unresponsive frigidity. The reason for this
difference is that in the first interpretation there is domain congruence
while in the second there is not. Thus, in the first interpretation, whereas
being physically cold (e.g. to the touch) is not a high salient, persevering
attribute of Sally, it is a high salient attribute of a block of ice,
consequently, it satisfies the conditions for being a simile. The attribute
"cold" applies to each term in the same domain. The communicative success
of such hyperboles depends on the fact that the intensity of the coldness is
different vis a vis the two objects, but it does seem to be the same
attribute. By contrast, in the second interpretation, the attribute "cold"
has to be applied across domains, namely from the physical, temperature,
domain appropriate to ice in the one case, to the emotional domain
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applicable to "psychological" characteristics in the other. This should not
be construed as a similarity statement that depends for its success on some
kind of pun, for as has already been implied, this characteristic turns out
to be quite widespread, often relying on systematic, conventional,
underlying analogies between two different domains (in this case,
temperature and emotions, and in others, luminosity and personality etc.).
In fact, Jackendoff (1975, 1976) argues that the entire semantic system of
English can be built up using such notions. He argues, for example, that
"give" is basically the same verb as "go" except that the domain of the
former is that of "possession" while that of the latter is that of
"location". One can see implicit in this approach the view that nonliteral
similarity is a fundamental building block of language in general.
It seems, then, that perceived metaphoricity depends not only on an
inequality between relative salience levels in cases where there are genuine
attribute matches, but also on domain incongruence in cases where there are
not. One might imagine an experiment in which ambiguous comparisons like
(17) appeared in contexts which forced either the domain congruent, or the
domain incongruent interpretation. Subjects asked to rate the degree of
metaphoricity should give higher ratings in the domain incongruent
interpretations. The question is whether or not a general account of dual
function terms can be provided within the present framework, and if so, how?
There seem to be two distinct possibilities. The first, proposed for
example by Searle (in press), is that the fact that some terms can be
conventionally applied in more than one domain cannot be generally explained
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in terms of similarity at all because there are no shared properties
between, say emotional coldness and physical coldness. The second approach,
taken for example by Asch (1958), opposes such a conclusion on two grounds.
First, it seems to leave the explanation of the specific domains to which
such terms are applied to historical accident, or chance. Second, if the
distinct meanings account were true, it would fail to explain the fact that
there is quite a wide degree of cross cultural agreement about dual function
terms. Asch concluded that "such terms refer not alone to unique sensory
qualities, but to functional properties or modes of interaction." (p.93).
One of Asch's examples was the term "hard". He argued that if "hard" is
conceived of functionally, then the similarity between its uses in the two
domains can indeed be based on a common property, namely the property
"resistant to change", and related ones, perhaps. However, as Searle
argued, it is much more difficult to find such common characteristics to
account for the use of "cold" as a dual function term. In particular, what
is difficult is to provide an account that explains why "cold" is
appropriate rather than "hot", so that an attribute like "unpleasant" will
not do the trick.
Such an account will now be proposed. It should be treated with
caution, however, since the purpose is not to claim that the details of it
are correct, but that the general form of it can be used to solve the
problem of dual function terms. In the schema for coldness--COLD (x)--the
knowledge that cold things are typically unpleasant to feel will be
represented, together perhaps with the knowledge that the degree of
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unpleasantness is closely related to the degree of coldness. The knowledge
that cold things tend to become relatively more solid and less volatile than
those same things when warm will also be represented, as will other
information of this rather generalized kind. So, cold things contain as
salient attributes their unpleasantness to the touch and their tendency to
solidify. Hot things, by contrast, have among their attributes,
unpleasantness to the touch, and a tendency to liquify. Abstracting from
these attributes one can extract constituents which include unpleasantness
and a tendency to resist change (for cold things), and unpleasantness and a
tendency to yield to change (for hot things). Now, to say that somebody is
a "cold person" is not only to communicate negative affect, which is a
salient attribute of physically cold things, by virtue of the attribute of
unpleasantness, it is also to communicate unresponsiveness which can be
regarded as the same concept as that attribute of cold things we are calling
"tends to resist change." So, one can abstract shared attributes that
account for dual function terms. Furthermore, the account captures the
difference between "warm" and "cold". Warm things are pleasant, and thus
positive affect is communicated by the term "warm" (while still conveying
the attributes of compliance and yielding). But hot things are less
pleasant, and may in fact become unpleasant, consequently "hot" is a poorer
candidate since even if it does not convey negative affect through
"unpleasantness" it may tend to do so through its relation to the concept of
"extremeness". (We shall not here be concerned with those other uses of
"hot", such as the use pertaining to certain sexual behaviors, and the use
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pertaining to stolen goods. However, the analysis ought to be able to extend
to such uses if it is adequate.)
It now becomes interesting to consider the relationship between "warm"
and "cold" and "soft" and "hard". It would seem that one of the differences
lies in the degree of positive or negative affect related to the two sets of
terms. This in turn suggests that it is more damning to call someone a cold
person than a hard person but that in certain contexts the two could be
interchangeable. Similarly, it might to be more of a compliment to call
someone a warm person than a soft person. Again, it should be emphasized
that the fact that the language does not provide ready-made labels for the
attributes in question may make it difficult to express the attributes that
are shared, but not necessarily to perceive them. A full articulation of
the shared attributes between terms such as "hot" and "soft" in their two
domains would probably reveal some additional differences that have been
ignored here, but the essential point is that a non-arbitrary account of the
existence and nature of dual function terms seems to depend on a theory of
similarity with the power to characterize the similarities of the terms as
applied in different domains. Such a theory has to suppose that the
representation of adjectives (and thus of attributes) is fundamentally the
same as the representation of nominals, as it is in schema theory.
Certainly, if one assumes attributes to be conceptual primitives, simple,
and devoid of internal structure (see Halff, Ortony & Anderson, 1976, for a
more detailed discussion), the problem of dual function terms, and many of
the problems of similarity statements in general, will persist.
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We are now in a position to pick up where we left off. When, as in
(14), we say that encyclopedias are like goldmines, a cognitive "gear
change" is needed. Goldmines are sources of physical wealth, encyclopedias,
of "mental" wealth. The possibility of applying the same term, "wealth" in
two domains is a result of the fact that there are systematic underlying
attributes that are shared by the two appl ications of the term. The
knowledge that the terms can be so applied serves, in comprehension, to
"short-circuit" what might otherwise have been a recursive process required
to uncover those similarities. However, the domain incongruence serves to
increase the semantic distance that the comprehension process has to bridge
so that the perceived metaphoricity of a similarity statement that involves
fundamentally different domains will be greater. That is why the two
readings that can be given to (17) seem to differ in their degree of
metaphoricity. Neither of them satisfies the requirements for being a
literal comparison, but one reading preserves domain congruence and the
other does not.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of dual function
terms. First, this kind of account can be used to deal more generally with
the systematic relationships that seem to exist between, for example,
locational and temporal terms (including prepositions -- compare "behind"
and "in front of" with "before" and "after"). Second, one should not be
misled by the apparent complexity of the shared attributes. Things seem more
difficult and complex than they probably are because attributes often do not
have conventional lexical items associated with them. Schemata do not have
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words as their constituents, and not all constituent have words
corresponding to them. This does not mean that the basic psychological
processes involved in their utilization, or in making comparisons between
them, detecting similarities, or anything else should therefore be more
complex or esoteric. This is true not only for the way in which attributes
of attributes might be represented, but also for the way in which the
concept of, say, "behind" might be represented.
Processing, and Attribute Promotion and Introduction
All too frequently research concerned with language processing fails to
take into account the purposes of communication, yet these purposes may have
significant influences on the processes that are involved in comprehension.
For the present discussion, two different kinds of purposes, and their
accompanying presuppositions, are extremely important in understanding what
is going on. They also point up a problem that arises if one tries to rely
exclusively on any sort of "feature matching" account of similarity
judgements. The two purposes that have to be distinguished are those of
reminding someone (for whatever reason) of something he or she is believed
to already know, with the expected result of drawing attention to it so that
it will be recognized as something already known (in the ordinary language
sense of "recognize"), and those of informing someone of something he or she
is believed not to already know, with the expected result that he or she
will come to discover something new.
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In the first of these cases, the attributes involved are already
present and the hearer is being invited to promote their salience.
Statements of this kind can therefore be conveniently labeled "attribute
promoting" statements. In cases of the second kind, the communicative intent
is to introduce certain attributes, so that they can be called "attribute
introducing" statements. Clearly, whether the issuance of a particular
statement on a particular occasion is attribute introducing or attribute
promoting depends not only on the statement itself, but also on the
available knowledge of both the speaker (or writer) and the hearer (or
reader). This is a perfectly general feature of linguistic communication.
Its importance in the case of similarity statements is due to the fact that
its acceptance precludes the possibility of any account that relies
exclusively on the presupposition that the matching attributes are already
present in the internal representations in order for comprehension to occur.
This, for example, is a problem with Tversky's account. Such models will
only deal with a subset of the cases. Thus, they will be fine for the
comprehension of a statement of similarity such as (17) when the hearer
replies, "Yes, I know she is. It's a shame isn't it?", but it fails to
explain how the hearer can make sense of it if the reply is "Oh really? I
didn't know that. I would never have thought it."
So, when we say "a is like b" we may be inviting the hearer not to find
a match of attributes, but to take some salient attributes of b that were
not previously part of the hearer's schema for a and to build them into the
schema for a. A matching strategy will not work for such cases. The
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question then arises as to what strategy will work, and whether the matching
strategy turns out to be a special case of it.
It would seem that the obvious strategy would be one of attempting to
apply high salient attributes of the b term to the a term. This would mean
that the comprehension process might be something like this: Starting with
the most salient sub-schemata of the b term, an attempt would be made to
apply each one to the schema for the a term. This would be equivalent to
trying to determine whether B.(a) could be true for low values of i. A
number of issues immediately arise. First, what kind of mechanism determines
whether or not an attribute can be predicated of something? Second, are the
attributes tried serially? Third, what criterion is there for deeming an
attribute to be insufficiently salient to warrant attempted application?
One can do little more than speculate about the answers to these
questions. But part of an answer to the first is obvious. One way to
determine whether some particular attribute can be applied to something is
to determine whether or not it is already included in the representation of
that thing. Thus, matching, or at least, testing for a match, might well be
the first step in the process, although it cannot possibly always be the
only step since if the test for a match fails, it is not possible to
conclude that the attribute in question cannot be applied, but only that it
is not already present. The simplest prospect if the match test fails would
be to determine whether any gross conceptual incompatibility would result by
applying the attribute in question to the concept. This incompatibility
would have to be unresolvable, even by domain transformation. Thus, for
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example, the attribute of being white cannot be applied to the concept
lectures as part of the process of trying to apply high salient attributes
of sleeping pills to the concept lectures, because to do so would result in
an unresolvable incompatibility. White things are physical objects, lectures
are not physical objects. Domain transformation will not help since in a
different domain white is symbolic of purity, an attribute that also does
not apply to lectures.
It would be reasonable to suppose that the attributes are tried more or
less serially, starting with the most salient attribute of the _b term. It is
not impossible, however, to conceive of groups of attributes being tested in
parallel, with the members of each successive group decreasing in salience.
In either case, the important thing is that overall, high salient attributes
of the second term will be tested before low salient attributes. Two
criteria need to be employed. The first concerns a stop rule given
successful application. At least for the purposes of superficial
comprehension, there has to be some criterion which, when satisfied, stops
further testing of less salient features. The criterion will depend on both
the number of attributes that have been successfully applied, and on their
relative salience with respect to the b term. One or two high salient
attributes of the b term that are found to be applicable to the a term will
be sufficient to arrest further processing. It is almost certainly the case
that processing can proceed beyond the criterion in certain cases, resulting
in a deeper understanding of the comparison. This is probably essential for
a proper understanding of literary similes. But, for the purposes of
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ordinary communication such deeper processing is not usually necessary. The
second criterion that is needed is one that stops processing because the
salience level of the b attributes has become too low when no successful
applications have been made. If no attributes have been found to be
applicable before this criterion is reached, the statement is, presumably,
uninterpretable. The degree of perceived similarity is bound to depend on
this criterion level since it controls the number and relative salience of
potential ly applicable attributes.
This raises the question of "contrived" interpretations. It is a
favorite occupation of linguists to dream up contexts such that in them the
seemingly most improbable utterance would make sense. Thus, when, as was
mentioned earlier, it is claimed that some statement such as (4), (5) or (6)
is uninterpretable, it is important to realize that this claim presupposes
what might be called "normal" contexts of putative use, including "normal"
construals of word meanings and "normal" speaker intentions. But this still
leaves unanswered the question of what kind of "abnormalities" are possible.
There seem to be two kinds of answers that can be given to this question.
First, a speaker (or hearer, or reader or writer) may reorder the salience
of the attributes of (especially) the second term in the comparison. Second,
the criterial levels just described can be changed so that what would
normally count as being too unimportant an attribute to be worth
considering, now is included as a candidate for application. Separating
these two is not an easy task. But the former, reordering, is clearly
involved when the kind of foregrounding described with respect to (12)
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occurs. Foregrounding, it may be recalled, promotes the salience of some
attribute or group of attributes, often with the result of reducing the
degree of metaphoricity. Thus (4) can be made interpretable by presupposing
a context in which being a physical object is very important. So a context
in which it makes sense to utter (18) will also be able to support an
interpretation of (4).
(18) In so far as they are both physical objects, billboards are like
spoons.
However, even though (18) and (4) are perfectly interpretable in a context
which permits the reordering of attributes, notice that without such an
assumption they are somewhat odd.
Examples of instances of reducing the criterion for high salience are
more difficult. Probably examples of this would be most appropriately drawn
from the relatively obscure similarity statements that can sometimes be
found in literary works.
The manner in which similarity statements are processed has
implications for the relationship between literal similarity, metaphorical
similarity, and anomalies. If attributes from the b term are indeed tested
in order of salience, then if a match is found with a high salient attribute
of the a term, the statement will be judged as a literal similarity
statement. If no match is found until low salient attributes of the a term
are reached, or if no match at all is found, but the attribute being tested
can be applied to the a term, then the statement will be judged as being a
metaphorical similarity statement. If, using high salient attributes of the
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b term, no match or possible application is achieved, then the statement
will be judged as being uninterpretable. Thus, these proposals concerning
the manner in which similarity statements are processed, have as a
consequence, the fact that literal similarity will generally be detected
before metaphorical similarity, which, in turn will generally be detected
before the judgement that the statement is anomalous will be made. Whether
or not this is the case remains to be seen.
The basic proposal, then, is that similarity statements are processed
by attempted predication. It may be, however, that if the process fails to
find a match of high sal ient attributes, or, more specifically, if it fails
to find a literal interpretation, that the matches that are subsequently
found come to be perceived as being more important than they otherwise
would. For example, the simile (19) seems to have a higher degree of
subjective similarity (if it is understood) than would be predicted by, say,
(1), even allowing for the proposed modifications to (1).
(19) Abdul-Jabbar is like the Sears building.
Furthermore, it appears to be the case that similes are rather like jokes in
the sense that if an initial failure to properly comprehend is later
followed by a full understanding, the anomalous components lose their force.
In an informal experiment conducted to gain some preliminary insights into
this question, it transpired that subjects rated the similarity of similes
as being higher when they were given a chance to perceive them as similes,
than when those ratings were made under conditions which encouraged literal
interpretations of them. All this suggests that subjects may be reducing the
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weights accorded to distinctive attributes (a and 3) on discovering that
they are working with a nonliteral comparison. If Abdul-Jabbar, the tallest
player in professional basketball, is seen as being like the Sears building,
the match on attributes like "being the tallest x" and "being prominent with
respect to others of its kind" somehow seem more important when the domain
incongruence has been resolved, and the non-matching attributes seem to lose
their force. Thus, it may be that one of the things that the resolution of
domain incongruence does is to reduce, perhaps to zero, the values of a and 1.
Analogies
A statement of analogy is a similarity statement of a special kind.
Whereas a similarity statement is an assertion of similarity between
objects, a statement of analogy is an assertion of similarity between
relations. With this in mind, it transpires that the analogy between
statements of similarity and statements of analogy is a very good one.
Perhaps much the same kind of theoretical treatment that applies to the one
can be applied to the other.
To start with, analogies, like similarity statements in general, can
vary with respect to their metaphoricity. For example, (20) has a higher
degree of metaphoricity than does (21).
(20) Encyclopedias are for scholars like goldmines are for prospectors
(21) Aida was for Verdi like Madam Butterfly was for Puccini
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In both cases the relations that constitute the basis of the similarity can
be regarded as the attributes over which potential matches are to be found.
Thus, (20) reduces to a comparison between two complex schemata, namely, one
constructed out of knowledge of encyclopedias and scholars, and the other
constructed out of knowledge of goldmines and prospectors. The attributes
of such complex schemata are the set of relations that in their entirety
make up the schema. One difference between such a statement of (analogical)
similarity and the kind of similarity statements that have been discussed so
far is that in the present case the schemata have to be constructed at the
time of comprehension, rather than retrieved from memory. Actually, it is
possible that in some cases this is not necessary, as perhaps with (21),
because, for example, the concepts "Aida" and "Verdi" may each have their
tokens occurring in the schema for the other. In the general case, however,
one cannot rely on this being the case. Now, suppose it is accepted that
(20) is more metaphorical than literal, especially when it is compared with
(21). Why should this be so? If one were to suppose that the most salient
relationship between goldmines and prospectors were those of high
desirability, and source of great wealth, then these relationships might not
be of such high salience for the relationship between scholars and
encyclopedias. Furthermore, the domain incongruence inherent in (14) is
still present in (20). By contrast, for (21), being one of the composer's
most famous operas is of high salience for both. Viewed in this way, it
could be argued that (20) is a metaphorical analogy because there are no
high salient attributes (i.e. relations) of the second term that are equally
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high salient attributes of the first (again viewing the terms as the
relationships between the constituents). But, (21) is a literal analogy
because there are high salient attributes of both complex concepts that are
shared.
The following metaphorical analogy is taken from a story about the
"alias program" for reinstating 'safe' lives for informers, reported in
Newsweek (November, 28th 1977). The story, entitled "Your cover is showing"
opens with the following analogy:
(22) Informers are to criminal justice what uranium is to a nuclear
reactor -
Left unexplained, (22) is somewhat obscure, perhaps because in constructing
a complex concept for the second term ("what uranium is to a nuclear
reactor") all kinds of relationships can be introduced, uranium is the fuel,
it is one of the more dangerous aspects of a reactor, etc. Yet, none of
these high salient relations are obvious, high salient relations of the
first term (what "informers are to criminal justice"). A literal analogy
would have a match of high to high salient relations, and this one does not.
Thus, one is willing to deny that it is true, literally, just as one is
willing to deny that nonliteral statements of similarity in general are
true. And, just as with similarity statements in general, the explicit
statement of the basis of the comparison that follows, serves to reduce the
perceived metaphoricity by enhancing the salience of a particular attribute.
The second part is essential if the entire sentence is to be understood:
"Informers are to criminal justice what uranium is to a nuclear reactor -
Beyond Literal Similarity
47
they make the system go, but they're an awful lot of trouble to dispose of
afterward."
Interesting things happen to analogies when their terms are omitted.
For example, one can reduce (20) to (14). Or, one can convert (22) into
(23), which makes it even more obscure because the missing term has to be
supplied, yet it depends on the to-be-established relation.
(23) Informers are the uranium of criminal justice
It is interesting to note, in this example, that the most natural
interpretation is far removed from that for (22). Now it seems that
"uranium" is functioning to highlight attributes related to value, so that
the most natural interpretation is that informers are very valuable to
criminal justice. One thing that this confirms is the claim made earlier,
namely, that attributes, since they can be complex, can often be equivalent
to relations, even though they may look like simple predicates. However, to
express relations in non-relational ways can, as in this case, be very
misleading. Since no sharp distinction is being made between statements of
similarity that are, and those that are not fundamentally analogical in
character, this matters little. But it is not very encouraging for those
(e.g. Miller, in press) who would argue for a conversion process of similes
and metaphors to analogies as part of the underlying comprehension
mechanism. Thus, the old Aristotelian notion that metaphors are based on
the principles of analogy is not very helpful. Neglecting for the moment the
distinction between metaphors and similes, it has to be concluded that
metaphors, like analogies, are based on the principles of similarity.
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Even if it is true that there is no fundamental difference between a
regular statement of similarity and an analogy, it does not mean that a
theory of similarity judgments is ipso facto a theory of the problem solving
that goes into the solution of analogy problems. For while it is true that
the present proposals predict that the more high salient relations will be
tested before the less high salient ones, they have nothing whatsoever to
say about the manner in which the complex concepts are constructed. In
standard analogy problems, part of the problem is to construct a schema that
involves the first pair of concepts in some central way in such a manner
that the relation between them can be applied to the other side of the
"equation". So, the approach to similarity being advocated is neither
capable of, nor intended to deal with the way in which analogy problems are
solved.
Metaphor
This paper started with a number of puzzles, many about metaphors. It
is now time to return to them and to see what progress has been made towards
answering them. The first puzzle concerns the interaction between the first
and second terms in a metaphor. In the present model the proposed solution
is that the first term (the topic) constrains those aspects of the second
term (the vehicle) that will jointly constitute the ground of the metaphor,
by requiring that the attributes of the vehicle should be not merely the
high salient ones, but high salient ones that are applicable to the topic,
but that are not already high salient attributes of the topic. This
explanation will seem a little less cryptic as more of the background is
explored.
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The first thing that needs to be done is to clarify the relationship
between statements of similarity, on the one hand, and metaphors on the
other. The traditional approach to this issue has been to view metaphors as
similes with the "as" or "like" deleted. Unfortunately, convenient as such
an account would be, it is a myth, since there are al I kinds of metaphors
which can not derived from a simile, by anything but the most tortuous and
unconvincing route. However, this account does have one merit, namely it
points to the possibility that metaphors might, at least sometimes, be
merely alternative surface structural realizations of similarity statements.
It does seem to be the case that nonliteral comparisons (that is, similarity
statements with a high degree of metaphoricity) can be converted into
metaphors by syntactic means. All the examples cited in this paper permit
such transformation. However, it should be noted that whether a similarity
statement is expressed as a simile or as a metaphor is likely to be somewhat
dependent on the context in which it is to be used. It is doubtful,
however, that the choice between a metaphor and its corresponding simile is
any more than a choice between two stylistic alternatives. The account of
similarity statements that has been offered proposes a processing mechanism
that is essentially one of predication. This being the case, the mechanism
for comprehending the metaphor (24) is going to be the same as that for
processing its corresponding simile, (14).
(24) Encyclopedias are goldmines
Now, the fact that the verb phrase contains a noun rather than an adjective
suggests that (24) is a class inclusion statement, that is, it suggests that
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all the attributes of "goldmines" are to be applied to "encyclopedias". If
they all are applicable, then it is a class inclusion statement, if not then
it is some other kind of statement, possibly a metaphor, but not
necessarily. In any event, the process of comprehending (24) is going to be
the same as that for comprehending (14) in the sense that attributes of the
second term will be applied to the first in order of salience. This account
of the comprehension of metaphors can obviously be generalized to cases in
which there is not a reasonable corresponding simile. Thus, if (25) is
uttered with respect to an ageing professor
(25) The old rock is brittle with age
it becomes very contrived to construe it as a simile with the "like" or "as"
deleted. The comprehension of (25) requires the identification of the
referent of "The old rock", and this is itself a metaphorical use of the
expression. Thus, one could conceive of the comprehension process as being
very similar to that for (26), although one does not have to maintain that
(25) has to be "internally converted" to (26) for comprehension to occur.
(26) The professor is like an old rock, brittle with age.
The claim, then, is that metaphors are comprehended by attempting to
predicate the attributes of the vehicle, in order of salience, to the topic.
The question is, how do the topic and the vehicle interact? To say that
they do interact is to say that the ground of the metaphor is dependent not
only on the (usually) metaphorical predicate, but also on the topic
expression. The present proposal maintains that the ground of a metaphor is
not just what the two terms have in common, but, more specifically, those
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common, or potentially common attributes, provided that they are of high
salience for the vehicle, and not for the topic, at least, not normally.
Thus, as Verbrugge and McCarrelI argue, "it is not sufficient to argue that
the topic is "passively" schematized by salient properties of a vehicle
domain." The topic domain makes its contribution by constraining which
salient attributes of the vehicle domain are to be applied by ignoring those
that are already salient for the topic domain, and by ignoring those that
are inapplicable to it.
The second puzzle raised by Verbrugge and McCarrell concerns, in
essence, the question "What makes a good metaphor a good metaphor? The
answer to this question is that the "goodness" of a metaphor depends on its
degree of metaphoricity. It has been argued that the degree of metaphoricity
depends on a number of factors, so that these factors, in their turn, affect
the goodness and appropriateness of a metaphor. The function relating the
two is probably not monotonic. It is more likely to be an inverted U-shaped
function with maximum values of goodness coinciding with middling values of
metaphoricity. This issue is actually complicated by a number of other
things that cannot be ful ly discussed here. Kintsch(1974), for example,
points out that the phrase "bachelor girl" seems much better than the phrase
"spinster boy", assuming that both are intended to be metaphorical
expressions. If these expressions are cast into similes ("Some girl (or
other) is like a bachelor", and "Some boy (or other) is like a spinster") it
would be necessary to show how the degree of metaphoricity of the former was
higher than that of the latter. The only hope would be to find that the
Beyond Literal Similarity
52
relative difference between the levels of salience of shared attributes was
higher in the one case than in the other, and/or that a number of attributes
(perhaps emotive ones) were present in the schema for one of the concepts
(e.g. spinster), that were not present in the schema for the other. Thus,
for example, attributes such as "being straight-laced" and perhaps that of
being "prudish" might be of high salience for spinster (and consequently
"being unmarried" might be relatively lower) whereas these attributes might
not exist in the schema for bachelor at all (and probably do not). Whether
or not this is the correct account for these examples, it is clear that the
explanation could be along these lines.
The third puzzle raised by Verbrugge and McCarrell is in fact concerned
with knowledge representations. The question of concern to them is how to
arrange for representations that are at once sufficiently flexible to permit
"novel conceptualizations", and sufficiently rigid to constrain reasonable
juxtapositions. The answer that has been provided for this question is to
think of the knowledge representations as having all the characteristics of
schemata.
An attempt has also been made to answer the other questions posed in
the introduction. Proposals have been made concerning the factors
contributing to asymmetry in both literal and nonliteral similarity
statements, the question about the effects of modifiers on metaphoricity has
been addressed, and an account of why some similarity statements are
uninterpretable has been offered. There remains, however, one issue, an
issue that relates to the common wisdom that everything is like everything
else.
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The reason for raising this issue is theoretical. The approach that is
being proposed denies that similarity statements like (14) assert a literal
similarity between the two terms. In other words, it can be argued that many
statements of similarity are not literally true (Encyclopedias are not
really like goldmines). But this produces a paradox if one believes the
common wisdom that everything is (somehow) like everything else. Moreover,
one of the most prevalent accounts of metaphor (see Searle, in press, for a
discussion) is that metaphors are really stylistic variants on similes, and
that similes are literal similarity statements. Denying, as we do, that
similes are literal similarity statements, threatens to deprive the simile
theory of metaphor of all explanatory power. To save the theory that
similes constitute a literal basis for nonliteral language, proponents of
the view might well resort to the claim that similes must be literal
comparisons since everything is like everything else. From this it would
follow, of course, that the terms in a simile must be (literally) like one
another. The general answer seems to be this. The common wisdom is true, or
nearly true, if one construes it to mean that everything is similar to
everything else taking "similar" to include not only literal, but also
nonliteral similarity. Furthermore, the similarity between two apparently
disparate things can be increased if one modifies the salience levels of the
attributes. Thus, the position that has to be taken on this issue is that
everything is not literally similar to everything else, but that
similarities between things not literally similar can be found by either
modifying the salience levels of attributes, or extending the sense of
"similarity" beyond that of literal similarity.
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